We describe research on a comprehensive ontology of sociotechnical and organizational factors for insider threat (SOFIT) 
Introduction
A serious threat is posed by insiders who seek to destroy, steal, or leak sensitive information, or act in ways that expose their organization to outside attacks. An insider threat is "a current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and who intentionally (or unintentionally) exceeds or misuses that access to negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems" [1] . Annual industry surveys consistently show that insiders pose the second greatest cybersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers, and that insider attacks are the costliest to organizations [2] [3] . An active research area for development of more effective detection and mitigation approaches is the identification, validation, and integration of cyber and behavioral (sociotechnical) indicators of insider threat risk [4] [5] [6] .
This paper describes continuing work on a comprehensive insider threat ontology [6] [7] that supports research to develop more effective decision support tools, facilitates insider threat program evaluation s, and promotes understanding of the complex insider threat domain. A hallmark of the ontology-called Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat (SOFIT)-is the inclusion of behavioral, social, and organizational factors in addition to the cyber/technical factors traditionally identified with insider threat risk. A general description of SOFIT and its class structure is provided in [7] . While the ontology was based originally on a unidimensional hierarchical taxonomy of factors, relationships have been specified to more fully characterize additional associations among insider threat indicators and related constructs; these associations extend the ontology beyond the simple hierarchical taxonomy from which it was derived. It now represents a collection of taxonomies. Indeed, this paper focuses on how the additional specification of associations among constructs yields a broader ontology that further informs insider threat assessment and mitigation. A primary objective of the current research is to examine how individual indicators and patterns of indicators contribute to judgments of insider threat risk. Though preliminary and requiring further research, results suggest both research and operational implications favoring the inclusion of behavioral and sociotechnical indicators.
General model
A general context and framework that informs the SOFIT ontology is shown in Fig. 1 . This framework depicts presumed underlying factors and processes at work as one progresses along a critical pathway that may culminate in a malicious insider exploit, consistent with the Critical Pathway model described in [8] . Since this framework does not describe processes associated with unintentional (nonmalicious) insider threats [9] [10], it only partially informs SOFIT.
The model distinguishes personal (individual) factors from external factors, and distal factors from proximal factors. Personal factors include psychological constructs and predispositions, internalized cultural norms and ideology, and capabilities (i.e., knowledge, skills, abilities), which, when combined with external factors, may increase the individual's motivation to act. Personal factors comprise the proclivity or vulnerability to malicious insider activity and include personal predispositions. External factors include stressors, opportunities that present themselves, and actions by the organization that may impact motivation. Distal factors include internal triggering processes, where personal and external factors generate an emotional/cognitive response that culminates in malicious intent. Proximal factors are behaviors that lead to an attack. While proximal factors are the most likely to be identified following the crime, we suggest that distal factors reflecting motivations may be most useful for proactive approaches that attempt to identify individuals who pose greater risks of committing these crimes. Altogether, these processes describe the complex mechanism at play for any potential malicious insider threat. This framework is strongly influenced by earlier works that describe the CMO (capability/motivation/opportunity) model (e.g., [11] ), the critical pathway model [8] , and numerous behavioral/psychologically oriented works (e.g.,
Each element of this framework can be directly or indirectly measured. Following the approaches described in [4] [12], we decomposed the various constructs into a hierarchical set of factors that supports analyses of data to infer observables, indicators and threat behaviors. In this proactive computational approach to insider threat mitigation, data are processed to reveal observables; collections of observables are analyzed to infer indicators (collections or patterns of observables); indicators are examined to infer target behaviors. Malicious (threat) behaviors are combinations or sequences of indicators and observables that represent a pattern of actions associated with an exploit. Recognizing target threat behaviors is therefore a complex, model-based classification process that involves inferences about multifaceted combinations or sequences of behavioral, psychological, and technical indicators. This interpretation of the threat assessment process provides a key rationale for related modeling efforts and the design of expert knowledge elicitation studies initially reported in [6] and [7] and extended here.
SOFIT Framework
The SOFIT ontology derives from a systematic review, analysis and synthesis of existing research, case studies, and guidelines by the insider threat research community. It is currently 6-7 levels deep, with 271 constructs defined as individual (human) factors and 49 as organizational factors [7] . Classes, which represent objects with similar structure and properties, are arranged hierarchically: subclasses or members of the classes are referred to as indicators [4] [5] [12] . Fig. 2 shows the main classes comprising the upper levels of the hierarchy. Fundamentally, the ontology attempts to describe individuals and organizations with various characteristics that increase the likelihood that an intentional or unintentional insider threat will occur. The ontology addresses both malicious and nonmalicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it distinguishes between actions performed by insiders from those by organizations (e.g., problematic responses to potential threats, poor institutional policies, or security practices). SOFIT is broader and deeper compared to other insider threat ontologies (e.g., [13] [14] This paper primarily focuses on the individual factors associated with insider threats; five parent classes and underlying indicator classes are shown in Fig. 3 . The ontology accounts for both malicious and non-malicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it distinguishes between actions performed by employees (as insiders) and actions performed by organizations (such as problematic responses to potential threats, poor institutional policies, or security practices). Individual factors reflect behaviors, attitudes, personal issues, sociocultural or ideological factors, and various biographical (life narrative) factors that may indicate increased risk. Protective factors (i.e., those that decrease risk) are not considered in this work. This branch of the taxonomy reflects the substantial body of work by a diverse set of researchers and practitioners focusing on concerning behaviors, sociocultural
Figure 2. Individual Factor Branch of SOFIT Ontology
factors, and psychological factors underlying insider threats, as shown in Fig.3 . Examination and discussion of works relating to psychological constructs (especially [5] [15]) led us to differentiate enduring psychological traits from dynamic states, consistent with findings that these two constructs are reliably distinct despite their admitted overlap (e.g., [16] [17] ) and with the diverse body of psychological research that hinges on (e.g., [18] [19] [20] ) or capitalizes on (e.g., [21] [22] ) that distinction. Finally, the inclusion of personal history and sociocultural factors derives from research and case studies (e.g., [23] [24] [25] [26] ). We adopted a "life narrative" factor construct based on the notion that certain sociocultural factors may be discerned from life narratives of individuals [27] . Fig. 4 depicts lower-level constructs within the Individual Factor branch: viz., a decomposition of the Job Performance class into two deeper-level subclasses, "Cyberloafing" and "Negative Evaluation." Within each of these subclasses are observables (such as "Excessive Personal Use of Work Computer"); lower-level constructs are defined but not shown in the figure. Measuring observables requires specifying and implementing detectors associated with these constructs (e.g., a detector for excessive personal use of work computer might be number of visits to nonwork-related websites). SOFIT stops short of specifying detectors, since these are organizationspecific and their specification would likely increase the size of the ontology by an order of magnitude.
Associated Constructs
Our research team relied upon research literature and our collective expert judgments to examine numerous associations among the factors represented in the ontology and relationships between these factors and other relevant constructs. We considered possible associations of the insider threat indicators with the following threat types [1] :
• Insider Sabotage: An act by an insider to direct specific harm toward an organization or its assets.
• Insider Data Theft/Exfiltration: Theft of sensitive information by an insider.
• Insider Fraud: Modification, addition, deletion, or theft, of an organization's data for personal gain, leading to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft, credit card fraud).
• Unintentional Insider Threat (UIT): An act or failure to act by an insider, without malicious intent, that causes harm or substantially increases the probability of future harm to an organization or its assets.
• Workplace Violence: Any act or threat of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, or other threatening disruptive behavior that occurs at the work site.
Based on our own judgments, the coauthors (FLG, JP, DEB, YML) individually and by consensus identified associations of individual factors with these six threat types. Considered preliminary until validated against independent expert knowledge or empirical evidence, these additional relationships among ontology constructs can support queries to generate lists of factors associated with insider threat types.
Using a similar individual-and-consensus procedure, we considered possible relationships between insider threat indicators and certain constructs that help to describe an indicator's role in the insider threat exploit: Precipitating Event, Predisposition, Behavioral Precursor, Technical Precursor, Access Path, and Contextual Factor (these constructs are defined in Table 1 ). Table 2 shows output from a query listing factors associated with the role, Predisposition. These factors come from different ontology classes (e.g., Boundary Violation, Job Performance, Psychological Factor/Enduring Trait). Table 2 . Factors associated with the role "Predispositions"
The primary associations of the ontology describe the hierarchical nature of the indicators. The associations between parent classes and child classes such as those illustrated in Table 2 are the major organizing principle for the indicators. Role type associations are considered secondary because indicators within a role are more heterogenous and less closely related. However, this perspective is based on narrative evidence alone. Indeed, it is possible to develop an alternative ontological structure based on roles instead of the class structure described in Section 3. It is therefore appropriate to ask: What aspects of the ontology (e.g., individual indicators, their roles, and parent class relationships) might best account for expert judgments of insider threat? We conducted an expert knowledge elicitation study to address this and related questions.
Expert Knowledge Elicitation Study
The ontology class structure is a framework for describing the domain of insider threat indicators. Further, SOFIT's structure encapsulates an inherent schema that we hypothesize analysts use to make judgments about insider threat risk. For example, an
Construct Definition Examples
Precipitating Event An event that triggers or motivates the insider to carry out an insider crime analyst may not be gravely concerned about a case within an organization unless an indicator from the data manipulation class is present. Likewise, the role of an indicator may provide valuable information about how an analyst interprets a case. For example, an analyst may deem a case less worthy of further investigation because there is no precipitating event or other factor indicating a motive. Therefore, the class structure and role structure may provide explanatory power for modeling expert judgments of potential insider threat cases.
Research Questions
Our research questions center on the hypothesis that expert judgments of the threat/risk rating (level of concern) for an indicator in isolation will provide a relatively powerful way to predict judgments of combinations of indicators (i.e., threat/risk rankings of cases). This is suggested by previous findings [5] [7] , but here we focus on more specific model- 
Method and Procedure
Thirteen experts from at least five participating organizations representing both research and operational experience participated in the study. Participants were recruited via a snowball recruitment method (seeded from our contacts across the research/operational communities). All had more than 5 total years of experience in insider threat or related fields, and 12 experts had 11 or more years of experience. In Part I of the study (survey open for 3 months), each of the participants provided ratings of level of concern for 202 indicators (out of the 271 individual indicators) in the ontology [ratings were on a 0-100 scale, where 0 = no concern at all and 100 = gravest concern about an actual exploit or strong inclination/likelihood of committing an exploit). Seven of these experts, all with 11 or more years of experience, opted to go on to Part II of the study (open for 2 months after Part I). In Part II, participants ranked 45 stratified random cases presented as combinations of 2 to 5 individual indicators. The cases were constructed to balance the number of indicators and degree of concern as considered by the experimenters who judged cases as low, medium, or high concern. Except for five cases that were given to everyone as "anchors", the remaining 40 cases varied across participants. An example of a case (considered by the experimenters to represent high concern) is the following, with indicators enclosed in brackets: Cases comprised simply the list of indicator labels (as above); definitions of indicators were available for review. Instructions for this ranking task were to sort cases into five "bins" corresponding to increasing levels of concern (Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, Moderate-High, Extreme), and then to rank-order the cases in each bin from highest concern to lowest concern. This results in a rank-ordering for the set of cases. The 315 cases ranked by the 7 experts were the unit of analysis for all regression analyses.
Results

Quantitative Models.
We examined five models that attempt to predict the expert's ranking of the level of threat in the cases, based on the indicators present in them. We use the variable, R, to denote the predicted level of threat or risk specified by each of these models.
• Counting model. R = Σxi, where xi has the value of 1 if indicator i is present, otherwise 0. Thus, if there are n indicators in a case, the risk will be n, irrespective of any differences in threat level for individual indicators.
• Regression model. R = Σbixi, where bi is the regression weight for indicator i. The regression model estimates many empirically-derived weights to predict the case rankings.
• Sum-of-Risk model. The risk for a case is the sum of the ratings of concern (ri) for the individual indicators contained in the case, i.e., R = Σrixi, where the ri represents the rating of concern for indicator i. Table 3 shows the beta weights and significance levels for the parent class indicators in the Class-Count model 1 . Note that because lower ranks represent higher concern, negative regression weights are expected.
The Role-Count model (R 2 = 0.42) was somewhat less predictive of case ranks than the Sumof-Risk model. Table 4 shows the beta weights and significance levels for the Role-Count model. Notably, and surprisingly considering that all factors are assumed to reflect some degree of risk/threat, the role type of Personal Predisposition attained a positive weight (β = 0.15).
Including both the class-structure and the rolestructure in the analyses provides explanatory power; however, there is a high potential for overlap. The relative incremental validities of parent class and role type were examined to determine if the contributions are independent. Role type predicted significantly beyond parent class, F(1,312) = 6.237, p = .013, ΔR 2 = 0.010. Similarly, parent class predicted significantly beyond role type, F(1,312) = 58.447, p < .001, ΔR 2 = 0.094. These results supported the notion that parent class and role type provide independent contributions to the expert judgments of threat rank. Although statistically significant, the 1 The 29 parent classes in Table 3 differ slightly from the most current representation (Fig 3) ; subsequent to the study, some indicator classes (e.g., attendance, affect) were placed lower in the hierarchy and therefore do not appear in the figure. We replicated the analyses using the current class structure, obtaining similar weights and an R 2 of 0.52.
incremental validity of role type over parent class was small, which implies parent class accounts for most of the variance and that the independent variance contributed by role type is relatively limited. Hierarchical regression was conducted to determine how much variance the Class-Count and Role-Count models account for beyond the Sum-ofRisk model. In the first step, the Sum-of-Risk model was considered independently to determine the baseline variance accounted for, R 2 = 0.48. The other two models were added in the second step and any increase in model fit was attributed to the added predictors, ΔR 2 = 0.04. As expected, given the small independent prediction, parent class predicted beyond the sum of ratings of concern (β = -0.34, p < .001); whereas, role type does not (β = -0.09, p = 0.25) when both structures are in the same model (see Table 5 ).
Ultimately, the variance in expert ratings of concern in isolation predicted level of concern for a case relatively well. However, the judgment process for cases is not solely explained as a simple summation of the individual risks. The additional prediction provided by parent class implies that the adjustment from a simple sum involves the parent class structure in some fashion. The lack of additional prediction from role type implies that the adjustment either does not involve role type or that the role type overlaps with parent class or ratings of concern. 
Discussion
The indicator level-of-concern values and number of indicators from each parent class predict expert judges' ranking of insider threat cases. As expected, the indicators for major security violation, network pattern, and data transfer pattern were the most predictive of the threat ranks for cases. Indicator role type was a substantially weaker predictor of case rankings, with, technical precursors and access path indicators showing the strongest relationship.
When paired with ratings of concern to make predictions about case rankings, the number of parent classes represented in the indicators (class structure) outweighed the number of role types (role structure).
Relative to the Counting model and the freely estimated Regression model, the predictive strength of the Class-Count model lends support for the ontological structure that was built for SOFIT. These results support the notion that the ontological structure aligns with the internal schema used by experts to make judgments about the relative concern of insider threat cases. In contrast, the mixed results of the Role-Count model may reflect the fact that judgments of level of concern at the individual indicator level matter more than judgments of indicator role. This suggests that the raters considered both psychological and technical indicators in rough proportion to their risk. Future research should investigate the conditions in which indicator role might have a more substantial impact on judgments of insider threat risk.
As constructed, the SOFIT ontology specifies concerning indicators, and consistent with this construction, our study showed that expert ratings of concern for all individual indicators were at least somewhat concerning on average (i.e., >20 on a 100-point scale). Indicators relating to the personal predisposition role type tended to reflect cases that were of lesser concern (positive β weight in Table 4 ). Since role type does not add validity to level of concern, this result likely reflects the fact that the personal predisposition role has the lowest average concern. Because the number of indicators in a case is limited, the roles do not occur independently in the sample of cases. This means that a case that includes one or more personal predisposition indicators would be likely to include fewer indicators from more concerning roles, such as technical precursors or access paths.
Conclusions
The results reported here support the inclusion of behavioral/social indicators of insider threat in modeling expert judgments, and further suggest that operational contexts relying on analyst judgment may benefit from decision support tools that use the SOFIT ontology. More specifically, we conclude that decision support tools for insider threat assessments should take account of the class structure. Further research is warranted to assess the possible impact of indicator role types.
Limitations
The results of the current and previous expert knowledge elicitation studies [7] are proxies for empirically investigating the predictive strength of indicators in an operational setting. Validity of proposed approaches and models cannot be faithfully Page 3209 determined without testing in real operational settings. The present line of research on insider threat indicator structure seems to warrant further investigation using real data with ground truth to validate the models beyond the prediction of expert judgments.
Future Work
To better understand relationships among constructs and their influence on insider threat judgments, additional expert knowledge elicitation studies should be conducted.
We continue to implement SOFIT functionality to support qualitative and quantitative insider threat assessment approaches. The intended solution will provide an interface to explore information beyond a simple list of indicators for a case being evaluated, so that the analyst may be provided additional information that serves to explain or justify the assessment. With this knowledge, the analyst can make an informed decision about forwarding the case for further investigation.
Our team has also begun to implement functionality within the ontology to help an organization assess its insider threat monitoring approach. This is based on a comparison of an organization's indicator portfolio with the domain of insider threat indicators specified in the ontology. This could be used in the design of a web-based assessment tool such as reported in [28] , and it would support the mandate of the National Insider Threat Task Force to conduct technology maturity level assessments of US departments/agencies capabilities for detecting insider threats [29] .
The present research offers two contributions. First. the results advance research on insider threat indicators. Second, results reported here can facilitate the development of ontology-based operational tools for both insider threat assessment and technical maturity level assessments of organizational insider threat program portfolios. This research will lead to the development and use of more effective, knowledge-based decision support tools for insider threat assessment.
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